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Overlapping Jurisdictions, Disputed Territory, Unsettled State: The Perplexing Case of 
Citizenship in Kosovo 
 
 
This paper examines the nascent citizenship regime in Kosovo since the country’s declaration of 
independence in 2008. It argues that the defining characteristics of the Kosovan citizenship are: 
(i) adoption of the “new-state” model (i.e. inclusion into its citizenship of all Kosovo residents); 
(ii) tension between civic and multicultural conceptions of citizenship on the one side, and ethno-
national conceptions on the other; (iii) contested nature and overlapping jurisdictions. In addition, 
it claims that the present legal, political and territorial dispute in Kosovo seriously undermines 
the consolidation of Kosovo’s citizenship regime and has turned Kosovo into a territory of de 
facto shared sovereignties (condominium-like constellations). 
 
Keywords: 




Kosovo was the last territory of the former Yugoslavia to declare its independence (on 17 
February 2008) and embark on the path to statehood and the creation of a separate citizenship 
regime.
1
 The most urgent and demanding task in designing and running the ‘newborn’ polity was 
to determine the nature of the polity, internal organisation and institutional arrangements, legal 
and constitutional order, state boundaries, as well as the nature of citizenship. However, as is 
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often the case, when the legitimacy of a political and territorial unit is disputed internally and 
externally, both the functioning of the state and the democratic consolidation of the political and 
citizenship regime are called into question. Consequently, other elements central to state building, 
such as the forging of an integrative ideology in a post-conflict society, are rendered problematic.  
Following on from Krasniqi (2010a), this paper focuses on the nascent citizenship regime 
in Kosovo since the country’s declaration of independence. It argues that the defining 
characteristics of the Kosovan citizenship are: (i) adoption of the “new-state” model (Brubaker 
1992, p. 277) i.e. inclusion into its citizenship of all Kosovo residents; (ii) tension between civic 
and multicultural conceptions of citizenship on the one side, and ethno-national conceptions on 
the other; and (iii) contested nature and overlapping jurisdictions. Moreover, the paper argues that 
the present legal, political and territorial dispute in Kosovo seriously undermines the 
consolidation of Kosovo’s citizenship regime and has turned Kosovo into a territory of de facto 
shared sovereignties (condominium-like ‘constellations’).2  
 As far as the adoption of the “new-state” model is concerned, it resulted both from 
Kosovo’s peculiar path to statehood (compared to the rest of the new states in Yugoslavia) and 
from active international intervention in the process of state building. Unlike other territories of 
the former Yugoslavia that had republic-level citizenship regimes during the socialist era, Kosovo 
had to constitute its independent citizenry from the start. The “new-state” model chosen in 
Kosovo - also known as the ‘zero option’ – where the initial body of citizens is constituted in a 
territorially inclusive fashion, in some ways reflects the vision of the international actors involved 
in the process, who wanted to utilize citizenship as a link between a war-torn community of 
people and a new polity based on principles of equality and inclusiveness. As will be discussed 
later in the text, based on the content of the constitution and basic statehood laws, as well as the 
character of its symbols and overall institutional design, Kosovo is at the same time a civic state 
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(with elements of individual liberalism and civic republicanism) of all its individual citizens (that 
are equal before the law) and a multi-ethnic state of different communities (Albanian, Serb, 
Turkish, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian).  
But more than three years after its declaration of independence, Kosovo still does not 
possess all of a state’s attributes, including external and internal sovereignty. This mainly stems 
from the issues related to Kosovo’s contested international subjectivity (as of August 2011, only 
81 Members of the United Nations have recognised Kosovo’s independence), and the refusal of 
Serbs from northern Kosovo to be integrated in the political system of Kosovo. The latter issue 
has created a “stateness problem” (Linz and Stepan 1992, p. 200) – a situation in which a 
considerable number of people question the legitimacy of the new polity and its borders. 
Kosovo’s stateness problem, combined with the intrusive attitude of Serbia towards the former, 
has resulted in a condominium-like situation of overlapping Serb and Kosovan jurisdictions, at 
least in the northern part of Kosovo.  
In terms of concepts and frameworks on citizenship, this paper will rely primarily on 
Christian Joppke’s concept of citizenship that distinguishes between citizenship as status, as 
rights and as identity (2007), Brubaker’s “new-state” model (1992) and his distinction between 
territorial/political and ethno-cultural conceptions of nationhood (1992a), and Rainer Bauböck’s 
work on “citizenship constellations” (2010) as well as on condominium, transnational citizenship 
and political autonomy (2007). These points are developed further in later sections. 
This paper is divided into three main sections. The first section presents some limited 
background material on citizenship-related issues in Kosovo before 2008. The second section 
examines the emergence of the new Kosovan citizenship regime and distinguishes between three 
aspects of citizenship; status, rights and identity. The third section focuses on the issues of 




2. State disintegrations, war, and international administration  
 
During the twentieth century Kosovo experienced different phases of political development and 
different citizenship regimes: the imperial Ottoman citizenship regime, the unitary citizenship of 
the royal Yugoslavia, the federal citizenship in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY) coupled with Serbian republican citizenship, the new federal citizenship arrangement in 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) between 1992 and 1999, and finally, the UN-
administered quasi-citizenship regime until 2008. Kosovo’s experience in socialist Yugoslavia is 
especially important, not least because of the fact that its present borders were determined and its 
first autonomous institutions were created in that period. A particularly important period is that 
between 1974 and 1989 when Kosovo possessed extended autonomy and obtained its own 
constitution, parliament, government, central bank, constitutional court, as well as representation 
in federal institutions independent from the Republic of Serbia. It was thus a republic in 
everything but name. Irrespective of the fact that Kosovo, like Vojvodina, did not posses its own 
provincial citizenship law (natives of these provinces automatically received Serbian citizenship), 
and could not legally claim the right of secession which was guaranteed only to the republics 
(Ramet 1992, p. 77), Kosovan authorities had exclusive responsibilities for a wide range of 
issues, such as issuing Yugoslav passports for the residents of Kosovo with a distinct code (KA) 
from that issued by Serbia, issuing certificates of citizenship, and maintaining the electoral 
register (Krasniqi 2010, pp. 5-7, Rava 2010, pp. 4-6)
.
 There is no doubt that in many aspects, this 
was a quasi-citizenship regime. The situation would, however, change drastically after 1989 
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when Kosovo’s autonomy was forcibly abolished by Serbia, and further complicated after the 
dissolution of the SFRY.  
In the aftermath of the dissolution of the SFRY, in 1992 the Republic of Serbia and the 
Republic of Montenegro together established the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) with 
Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia. In terms of citizenship, the FRY did not adopt a new law 
until 1996. In the meantime, the intensification of discriminatory practices aimed at ethnic 
Albanians in Kosovo resulted  “in widespread involuntary migration”.3 The removal of 
citizenship from those who fled became an everyday practice in Kosovo and was condemned 
internationally (Weller 2009, p. 62). In addition, new legislation was adopted to encourage Serb 
settlement in Kosovo (Weller 2009, p. 31; Rava 2010, pp. 9-10). Discriminatory and arbitrary 
practices, including mass dismissals of ethnic Albanian civil servants from the ranks of the public 
administration, created a new harsh reality for the Albanian population and turned Kosovo into a 
segregated society. In reaction to these repressive measures, Albanians in Kosovo, under the 
leadership of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), organised their own referendum on 
independence, declared Kosovo’s independence, which was already a “phantom state,” (Judah 
2000, p. 65) and set up their own parallel system of education and health.  
The situation deteriorated further after the eruption of the armed conflict in Kosovo in 
early 1998 between Yugoslav military and paramilitary forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA), which culminated in the military intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) in the territory of the FRY. During this period, the FRY authorities carried out a large-
scale action of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo which resulted in more than 850,000 Kosovan 
Albanian refugees being deported into neighbouring countries; hundreds of thousands of others 




‘Habitual residents’ under international administration   
 
After the end of the conflict in Kosovo in 1999, the country was placed under direct international 
(interim) administration, under the authority of the United Nations. UN Resolution 1244 created 
a new reality in Kosovo, which in the context of citizenship, was rather complex and unique.  
Despite the fact that the body mandated to administer Kosovo, the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), took significant steps towards the complex task of 
creating a political regime for democratic self-government in Kosovo, or “democratisation 
without a state” (Tansey 2007), regulation of the citizenship issue was considered to be outside 
its mandate. This was due to the fact that internationally Kosovo was still part of the FRY and its 
inhabitants were legally Yugoslav citizens. 
Nonetheless, UNMIK created a separate civil register (Central Civil Register of Kosovo) 
for the residents of Kosovo, which in a way became a substitute for citizenship regulations, and 
issued UN Travel Documents to habitual residents in Kosovo (Krasniqi 2010, pp. 9-11). Hence, 
in certain aspects, UNMIK, which was mandated to administer Kosovo until the moment of final 
status settlement, set up the foundations of a new quasi-citizenship regime, quite similar to the 
one that existed between 1974 and 1989. Residents of Kosovo could be divided into two 
categories: those who still possessed Yugoslav passports
4
 (and UNMIK documents) and those 
who possessed only the UNMIK ones. The latter were de facto stateless. In fact, in 2004 Serbia 
adopted a new citizenship law, which did not make any specific provision for the residents of 
Kosovo or take into consideration the new reality in Kosovo (see Vasiljević in this volume). Its 
residents were in principle considered to be Serbian citizens.  
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3. Politics and citizenship in the ‘newborn’ state of Kosovo 
 
After 15 rounds of negotiations, and with no compromise between leaders of Serbia
5
 and Kosovo 
on the horizon, on 26 March 2007 Martti Ahtisaari, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations for Kosovo, presented his final version of the Comprehensive Proposal for 
the Kosovo Status Settlement (known as the Ahtisaari Plan) to the Security Council and the 
Secretary General. According to Weller, this proposal, which contains a short framework 
agreement and twelve annexes, “provided everything that Kosovo would require to form itself 
into a state, and for others to recognise it as a state should they so wish” (2009, p. 209). Having 
already endorsed the Ahtisaari Plan and with the UN Security Council unable to agree on a new 
resolution in March 2007, Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008. Kosovo was 
declared “to be a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic, guided by the principles of non-
discrimination and protection under the law.”6 Shortly thereafter, the Kosovan Assembly adopted 
a whole package of basic statehood laws, including the Law on Citizenship,
7
 and started the 
process of replacing UNMIK documents (IDs and passports) with Kosovan ones, in this way 
setting up the contours of an independent citizenship regime, the first in the history of Kosovo.  
Because of strong international participation during its creation as a state, Kosovo can be 
considered a “state of international design” (Bose 2005, p. 322). This involved the application of 
a certain vision of state-building, which combined multicultural and civic elements, in a country 
where the number of minority groups does not exceed 10 per cent of the population. 
Implementing such a vision, however, was going to be a big challenge because of ethnic tensions 
and divisions in post-war Kosovo on the one hand, and the desire of local leaders to have a state 
that reflects the wishes of the ethnic majority (Albanians) on the other. In Brubaker’s (1992a, pp. 
x-xi) terms, this represents a tension between two different understandings of nationhood: 
 9 
territorial and political (the French model), where nationhood is understood as political fact, and 
ethno-cultural (the German model), where nationhood is understood as an ethno-cultural fact. 
Indeed, this tension is still very much present in Kosovo. 
In what follows I look at the Kosovan citizenship regime using Joppke’s (2007, p. 38) 
concept of citizenship that distinguishes between at least three aspects of citizenship; status, 
rights and identity. The first aspect of citizenship denotes formal state membership and its 
associated criteria; the second aspect is both about ‘classical’ civic, political and social rights, as 
well as about the new generation of rights, namely multicultural recognition; the third aspect 
refers to the behavioural dimension of individuals at a time when membership in a state and 
identity often diverge (ibid).  
 




Kosovo is not defined as a national state of its titular nation, but a multi-ethnic state of all 
citizens, guided by principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law of all 
communities. Constitutionally, Kosovo is defined as “a state of its citizens” (Article 1.2). Its 
citizens are tied to the new country based on a common citizenship, rather than on their national 
belonging or descent. Based on its legislation, Kosovo is, using Walzer’s (1983, p. 41) typology, 
more of a ‘French political club’ than a ‘German family home’. Certainly, citizenship aims at 
replacing divisions of ethnicity, religion or social status, therefore serving as a mechanism of 
ensuring equality before the law.  
In the absence of a previous independent citizenship regime on which it could be based, 
Kosovo’s only viable solution was to opt for what Brubaker calls the “new-state” model.9 The 
two main provisions that define the scope and character of citizenship in Kosovo, including the 
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body of citizens, inclusiveness, and openness, are articles 28.1 and 29.1 of the law. Article 28.1 
of the new law provides that any habitual resident of Kosovo based on UNMIK Regulation 
2000/13 is considered ex lege a citizen of the Republic of Kosovo. Thus, paraphrasing Brubaker, 
“[by] constituting the population of its territory as its citizenry, the new state extends its 
jurisdiction and asserts its authority evenly throughout its territory” (1992, p. 278). Such a 
territorially-inclusive definition of citizenship brings Kosovo closer to the new-state model 
commonly called ‘zero option’, which was applied in the case of newly-created post-Soviet 
states. Article 29.1, on the other hand, enables all pre-war residents of Kosovo (who were citizens 
of the FRY) and their direct descendants to be considered as citizens of Kosovo. This provision 
leaves open the possibility that people who left or were driven out of Kosovo in the course of the 
conflict (mainly Serbs and Roma) can claim their citizenship rights upon their return to Kosovo. 
In a similar vein, the principle of dual citizenship is especially important in the case of Kosovo 
and was introduced mainly to accommodate the needs of the Serb minority in Kosovo (but also 
many Albanians living in diaspora). Dual citizenship in Kosovo is considered to be an “open 
door” for integration of the Serb population into the Kosovan state and society.10 
Irrespective of the fact that it has a considerable diaspora, estimated at between 400,000 
and 800,000 (Mustafa et al 2007, Haxhikadrija 2009) and is surrounded by ethnic Albanians 
living as minorities in the former Yugoslav republics, namely Serbia, Macedonia and 
Montenegro, Kosovo’s capacities in designing and implementing diaspora or kin-state policies 
are limited both legally and practically. Kosovo’s constitutional definition as a state of its citizens 
(as opposed to an ethno-national state) formally prohibits Kosovo from adopting paternalist 
policies toward the Albanian minorities in the neighbouring states, especially those residing in 
Presevo Valley (an Albanian inhabited region in southern Serbia) who have multiple political, 
cultural and economic ties with Kosovo. As far as the Kosovan diaspora is concerned, despite the 
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fact that the law foresees facilitated naturalisation for this category, it does not define or 
differentiate it on the basis of ethnicity. Moreover, unlike some other countries in the region 
(Croatia and Macedonia) the Kosovan Parliament does not have reserved seats for the diaspora.  
In the case of Kosovo, the task of constituting the initial body of citizens is further 
complicated by the stateness problem that Kosovo faces in its northern territory, as well as by the 
issue of the Serb and other non-Albanian (mainly Roma) IDPs (Internally Displaced People) and 
refugees that left or were forcefully driven out of Kosovo in 1999. Serbs from northern Kosovo 
have so far refused to accept the boundaries of Kosovo and question the legitimacy of the new 
state. They have continuously boycotted elections organised by Kosovan institutions, refused to 
cooperate with the latter as well as to accept Kosovan documents, although some reports suggest 
that hundreds of Serbs from northern Kosovo have acquired Kosovo ID cards in order to receive 
pensions from the Kosovo budget (KOHAnet 2010). In spring 2011, Serbia urged local Serbs in 
the northern part of Kosovo to boycott the first overall census in Kosovo in thirty years that was 
organised by the Kosovan Statistical Office. In the face of the boycott, Kosovan institutions have 
postponed the census in that part of the territory. As for the refugees, their numbers remain highly 
contested and their return politicised.  
In sum, Kosovo’s citizenship legislation, though very open and inclusive, will take time 
and enormous efforts to be implemented up to the point where Kosovo will have a clearly defined 
citizenry. In contrast to many other post-communist countries in the region, Kosovo’s legislation 
is not designed and cannot serve as an instrument of “bureaucratic ethnic cleansing” (Hayden 
1992, p. 668) in the process of the constitution of the body of citizens. Although a civic and 
multicultural conception of citizenship underpins the current legislation, the refusal of Serbs from 
northern Kosovo to be integrated within the institutional framework of the new state and the 
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politicisation of the issue of refugees and return have undermined efforts to consolidate Kosovo’s 
citizenry.   
 
b) Citizenship as rights  
 
Citizenship today is about classical civic, political and social rights, as well as about the new 
generation of rights, namely multicultural recognition. In the case of Kosovo, ethnicity and group 
rights have been paramount values in UNMIK’s ethnicised discourse since 1999. Although the 
very idea of multicultural liberalism is about additional group rights that would only supplement 
individual rights, what we see in the case of Kosovo, nonetheless, is an attempt to overemphasise 
group-differentiated rights. Despite the fact that constitutionally Kosovo is defined as “a state of 
its citizens” (Article 1.2), meaning civic state, “multi-ethnicity” is the keyword in both the 
Ahtisaari Plan and the Kosovan Constitution itself. If equality is established legally among all 
citizens, politically every citizen is defined as a member of a community. The term community in 
this case refers to “inhabitants belonging to the same national or ethnic, linguistic, or religious 
group traditionally present on the territory of the Republic of Kosovo” (Article 57.1 of the 
Constitution). All the constitutionally recognised communities in Kosovo are granted specific 
group-rights, including reserved seats in the parliament (10 for the Serb community and 10 for 
the rest), at least two ministerial portfolios in the government, and proportional representation, as 
well as quotas, at other levels of governance. Moreover, the principle of double-majority is put in 
place for these pieces of legislation that are of ‘vital interest’ to minority communities. Indeed, 
such provisions of ethnic group rights present in the Kosovan legislation are similar to those 
found in Bosnia and Macedonia (Sarajlić 2010; Spaskovska 2010), and in the main reflect the 
international community’s ‘multicultural vision’ in shaping post-conflict societies in the Balkans. 
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The new Kosovan Constitution on the one hand, by refusing to recognise exclusions, 
loyalties or claims of ancestral rights, defends the universalist values of civic republicanism and 
individual liberalism, but also speaks out for group rights (communities) and defends their 
exclusivity and group differentiated rights. Certainly, in the case of Kosovo we have de-
ethnicisation of state institutions on the one hand, but on the other a multi-ethnic composition of 
the society reflected in politics i.e. ethnicisation of the political and social status of its citizens. 
As a result, we have at the same time neutral civic state institutions, and yet the very functioning 
of the state is based on multi-ethnicity (the neutral state being there to ensure that no group will 
dominate or be discriminated against). Indeed, elements of multiculturalism and civic 
republicanism are melted together in the Kosovan legislation. 
 
Citizenship, territory and minorities 
 
In the case of Kosovo and its efforts to create an independent citizenship regime, territory is of 
exceptional political and geopolitical relevance. The Serb-Albanian dispute over the territory of 
Kosovo has been central to the conflict and continues to determine relations between the two 
groups in Kosovo, even in the context of citizenship and minority rights. In an attempt to respond 
to the post-war ethno-demographic segregation and creation of small Serbian-controlled areas in 
Kosovo (in particular, the northern part of Kosovo) - which since 1999 functioned like enclaves – 
the representatives of the international community present in Kosovo decided to create new 
municipalities (based on the principle of ethno-majoritarianism). The issue of decentralisation, 
which was initiated years before by UNMIK under the title of ‘local self-government reform’, has 
been a burning issue during negotiations for the final status settlement. The final result, the 
Ahtisaari Plan, offered a broad range of rights to communities, including the decentralisation of 
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power. Thus the Republic of Kosovo is a unitary state with a decentralised structure (Weller 
2009, p. 214).  
Accordingly, immediately after independence, the Kosovan authorities initiated the 
creation of new municipalities with a Serb majority, in compliance with the Ahtisaari Plan. In the 
local elections of 15 November 2009, the first ones to take place in an independent Kosovo, 
representatives of the Serb community successfully gained power in four municipalities 
(including three newly created ones), boycotted the elections in three municipalities in northern 
Kosovo, lost in one municipality, and were successful in a further new municipality in elections 
organised in June 2010 (KIPRED 2009). Undoubtedly, the creation of new municipalities 
fostering a substantial rate of participation amongst the Serb community in the elections was a 
major challenge overcome by Kosovo in the aftermath of its independence. These new 
arrangements suggest that Kosovo is moving towards ethnic minority autonomy through strong 
decentralization within a unitary state, which allows territorially concentrated minorities to 
control local administration (similar to those applied in Macedonia after 2001).  
 
c) Citizenship as identity 
 
There has been a huge level of external involvement in Kosovo since 1999. Its legal foundations 
are a product of attempts by Kosovo’s sponsors and supervisors (the EU and the US) to decouple 
“notions of nationality and citizenship” (Allcock 1996, p. 74) and to reshape ethnic identities in 
the Balkans by way of institutional engineering. In this context, Kosovo is a “post-national state” 
where state membership and identity are, using Joppke’s (2007, p. 44) terminology, “structurally 
decoupled,” with the state being unable to impose a certain identity on its citizens. Certainly, this 
affects other essential issues such as state cohesion, because a state that provides for liberalised 
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citizenship and extensive minority rights often faces problems of unity and integration (ibid).
 
In a 
situation where recognition of group rights seems to perpetuate group differences, the state of 
Kosovo lacks the necessary integrative ideology.  
Returning to the issue of citizenship as identity, according to Joppke (2007, p. 44), it 
encompasses both the views held by ordinary people and official views propagated by the state. 
As far as ordinary people in Kosovo are concerned, they seem to be divided based on ethno-
national belonging and pledge loyalty to their ethnic nations or their kin-states. In reality, many 
Kosovan Albanians do not consider Kosovo (including its legal framework and state 
iconography) to reflect its overwhelming Albanian majority, whereas most of the Serbs consider 
it to be ‘an Albanian state’. This is why both Albanians and Serbs continue to prefer their 
respective national symbols (Albania’s and Serbia’s respective iconography) over the new 
Kosovan ones. Kosovan Albanians are divided between a minority who promote the idea of a 
Kosovan nation and those who think that Kosovan Albanians are simultaneously an indivisible 
part of the Albanian nation in the Balkans and Kosovan citizens. Likewise, many Kosovan Serbs, 
including those who are already working under Kosovo’s legal framework, still remain reluctant 
to identify with the new state (the growing number of Serbs with Kosovan identity cards and 
passports does not necessary mean that they identify with the new state) precisely because they 
see it as an ‘Albanian creation’.  
On the other hand, as far as the second view of citizenship as identity – namely, the 
official view propagated by the state – is concerned, the new Kosovan state does not have a 
consistent view related to citizenship and identity. To begin with, the present institutional elite of 
Kosovo is entrusted with the building of a type of polity (an ethnically neutral state where 
citizenship enshrines rights for ethnic communities) that is far less than their initial ambition  (a 
full-blown Kosovo Albanian nation-state). Many Kosovan politicians, both among the majority 
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and minority communities, are not proponents of civic conceptions of nationhood. A case in point 
is a political organisation called ‘Self-Determination Movement’ (Lëvizja Vetëvendosje!) that 
entered the Kosovan Parliament in 2011 (becoming the third biggest party), whose campaign was 
based on an anti-Ahtisaari and unification with Albania platform. 
The state’s current ‘ideological vacuum’ leaves local people with no choice but to stick to 
their notions of ethno-national belonging and to continue to show symbolic and emotional loyalty 
to their respective nations. Both its volatile and tragic past and its present constitutional design 
prevent Kosovo from achieving a higher level of internal cohesion among its citizens. Given its 
situation of a “deinstitutionalized nation” (Pula 2008, p. 81) and institutionalised communities, 
Kosovo’s only integrative ideology might be what Habermas (1996, p. 289) refers to as 
“constitutional patriotism.”  
In summary, the ongoing state-building process in Kosovo is characterised by a tension 
between the ethno-cultural and political aspects of nationhood, statehood and citizenship. 
Kosovo’s Constitution and basic statehood laws have strong civic underpinnings (most notably 
manifested in the preamble of the constitution and the declaration of independence), but when it 
comes to various political rights, individuals can exercise them through their membership in a 
community (defined on ethnic basis). This tension is visible in the flag and symbols of the new 
state, designed also by the international community: the geographical shape of Kosovo suggests 
its territorial and civic nature and 6 stars above it, the equality of 6 constitutive communities 
(ethnic groups). Likewise, the lack of wider legitimacy of the new state’s institutions, and of a 
higher sense of identification with the state (a form of ‘we feeling’), which derive from the 





4. Contested territory and statehood, overlapping jurisdictions 
 
From the origin of the modern state, the idea of citizenship has been closely related to territory. 
Membership of a polity meant access to a certain part of territory that belonged to a state. Thus, 
most theories assume that citizenship is “a relationship between individuals and political 
authorities inside an undifferentiated state territory” (Bauböck and Guiraudon 2009, p. 440). Yet 
in the age of plural membership and multi-level governance, individuals can be connected to a 
more complex web of legal and political rights beyond the borders of a single polity. Therein, 
Bauböck and Guiraudon argue that “territorial borders of states generally do not coincide with the 
boundaries of citizenship” (ibid.). This is determined by at least three factors: first, citizenship 
rights can be carried and exercised from abroad (external citizenship); second, states might be 
divided into different jurisdictions (ibid.); and third, the case of “unsettled states, disputed lands” 
(Lustick 1993). 
 In the case of Kosovo, due to the complex and unique interplay of all these three factors, 
the borders of the polity do not coincide with the boundaries of citizenship. As regards the issue 
of external citizenship – understood as “a generic concept that refers to the status, rights and 
duties of all those who are temporarily or permanently outside the territory of a polity that 
recognizes them as members” (Bauböck 2009, p. 478) – by allowing dual and multiple 
citizenship, Kosovo thus includes in its citizenry many citizens with long term residence abroad. 
In addition, it also includes other people who at the same time hold citizenship of another state in 
the region (Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia etc). On the other hand, when it comes to 
the issue of the subdivisions within the territory, according to the Ahtisaari Plan and the Kosovan 
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Constitution, Kosovo is a unitary state, although with a decentralised structure of local self-
government that in practice means the creation of territories with strong ethnic majorities. 
 At present, Kosovo remains both a contested territory and an unsettled state. Its statehood 
is contested both internally and externally. As regards the international aspect, Serbia, Russia, 
Spain and other members of the international community have fiercely opposed Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence in February 2008. This opposition and the declaration of 
independence without an approval from either Serbia or the Security Council of the UN have 
resulted in a limited number of recognitions of Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence thus far. 
Up to August 2011, Kosovo has succeeded in becoming a member of the World Bank and of the 
International Monetary Fund, but UN (as well as OSCE and Council of Europe) membership is 
still not in sight. The 2010 International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion
11
, which found that 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate general international law, contrary to initial 
expectations
12
, did not trigger a new wave of recognitions (which are essential in strengthening 
Kosovo’s international subjectivity).  
Internally, Kosovo’s Serbs, backed by the Serbian state, have opposed the new state. 
Consequently, Kosovo’s sovereignty is limited in some areas of the country, especially in 
northern Kosovo, which is de facto under the control of Serbia.
13
 The end result is a situation of 
(informal) overlapping sovereignties and jurisdictions. As far as the issue of sovereignty is 
concerned, the challenge to Kosovo’s assertion of sovereignty is twofold. First, Serbia still treats 
Kosovo and its citizens as part of its territory and citizenry. In what is considered a clear attempt 
to undermine Kosovo’s sovereignty, Serbia has maintained parallel structures in many parts of 
Kosovo and most notably in the northern part of the country since 1999. Although most of the 
Serb parallel structures in other parts of Kosovo have been shut down or replaced by Kosovan 
ones, northern Kosovo remains largely out of Pristina’s control .  
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Northern Kosovo - which comprises the northern part of the city of Mitrovica, as well as 
three other small municipalities and is about 1,000 square kilometres and 3 per cent of the overall 
population (some 65,000 Serbs and 10,000 Albanians and Bosniacs, see ICG 2011, p. 1) – 
embodies the core of the dispute between Serbia and Kosovo. Serb and Kosovan institutions 
“intersect and overlap in the North without formal boundaries or rules” (ICG 2011, p. i). 
Members of the Serb and Albanian community living there are tied to different (Serb or Kosovo 
funded) social, political and security structures, including banks, schools, health centres. 
Nonetheless, as a recent report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) suggests, people there 
have “developed pragmatic ways of navigating between these parallel systems where cooperation 
is unavoidable” (2011, p. 1). Courts are largely dysfunctional, and despite the presence of 
Kosovan and international police, intimidation and harassment “target the small Northern 
political, economic and social elite: opposition politicians, NGO activists, business rivals and 
anyone publicly associated with Kosovo institutions” (ICG 2011: p. 14). Consequently, whereas 
northern Kosovo remains outside Pristina’s sovereignty, its Serb population resists integration 
within Kosovo’s citizenry, thus rendering Kosovo one of those cases where boundaries of 
citizenship are smaller than the state’s territorial borders.  
Kosovo’s assertion of sovereignty is also challenged by the fact that its independence is 
supervised internationally and this creates various sovereignty-related limitations. The Ahtisaari 
Plan foresaw a smooth transfer of power from the UN to the EU. This meant the termination of 
UNMIK’s mandate and an increased role for the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) mission and 
ICO (International Civilian Office) to strengthen its institutions, monitor their performance and 
the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan. After declaring independence, Kosovo invited the EU 
to deploy a rule of law mission in Kosovo, but because of the lack of consensus at the UN and the 
EU (Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia refuse to recognise Kosovo’s independence), 
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EULEX was deployed in Kosovo “under the general framework of United Nations Security 
Resolution 1244,”14 which requires it to adopt a ‘status neutral’ approach. This slowed down the 
process of transition from the UN to the EU and created confusion amongst the UN, EU, and 
EULEX officials. The end result is that at least four different sets of institutions operate in 
Kosovo (Kosovo’s, UNMIK’s, EULEX’s and Serbia’s) creating a highly complex net of 
institutions, legal norms and jurisdictions that often overlap. This way, Kosovo residents are tied 
to at least two polities (Kosovo and Serbia) and even more political authorities determine their 
legal rights. 
   
5. Disentangling Kosovan citizenship: heading towards a form of condominium? 
 
Ultimately, citizenship is about membership in a political community. This is an essential 
precondition for individual autonomy and well-being (Bauböck 2009, p. 478). Although it is 
widely recognised that everyone should be entitled to the right of membership in a political 
community, according to Bauböck (2009), “we need to know which communities have a claim to 
self-government and which individuals have a claim to citizenship in a particular self-governing 
community” (p. 478). Undoubtedly, the first question lies at the heart of the ongoing political, 
legal and territorial dispute in the case of Kosovo. As I have shown, various obstacles, mostly 
related to the issue of Kosovo’s challenged legal and international status, hinder the significant 
progress made in the context of consolidation of Kosovo’s independent citizenship regime. 
Hence, the overall progress in the process of state-building in Kosovo is inherently linked to the 
consolidation and functionality of the citizenship regime.  
Citizenship, understood as status, rights and identity, has been central to the negotiation 
process and the overall political and constitutional settlement in Kosovo and the state-building 
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process since 2008. But effective citizenship requires a legitimate polity and political institutions 
that can enforce laws. In the case of Kosovo, the new polity is not seen as fully legitimate by a 
part of its population (Serbs), as well as by the Serbia and other members of the international 
community. In the same vein, Kosovo’s institutions still have limited capacities to enforce laws 
throughout the territorial borders of the new state. This has resulted in a situation of overlapping 
citizenship regimes, sovereignties and jurisdictions between Kosovo and Serbia. 
Disentangling the perplexing issue of citizenship in Kosovo requires solving the issue of 
statehood, both internally and externally. The present deadlock acts to the detriment of Kosovo’s 
efforts to establish an independent citizenship regime suitable for a state defined in civic terms, as 
well as to ensure the necessary compliance with the international norms through membership in 
international organisations. The ongoing dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia that began in 
March 2011 and is facilitated by the EU, may help in solving some troublesome issues, but it is 
unlikely that it will solve the issue of Kosovo’s sovereignty.15 In addition to this, the EU’s 
inability to speak with a single voice in the case of Kosovo has lowered expectations and created 
many practical problems.  
Kosovo’s present unfavourable status quo and the vicious circle imposed as a result of 
Kosovo’s legal obscurity represent a de facto condominium-like citizenship constellation. The 
present situation in Kosovo contains elements of both territorial condominium and strongly 
overlapping citizenship regimes. On the one hand, Serbia actively exercises control in the 
northern part of Kosovo, thus turning the latter into a de facto Serb-Kosovan sovereignty. On the 
other hand, Serbia claims and legally maintains state jurisdiction over the residents of Kosovo 
(although the treatment of ethnic Albanians is clearly different), a territory it generally claims to 
be part of Serbia together with all Kosovo citizens. As a result, many Kosovo Serbs and 
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Albanians remain legally tied (albeit symbolically through personal documents) to both Kosovo 
and Serbia. 
If there is no breakthrough in Kosovo’s consolidation of statehood as envisaged in the 
Ahtisaari Plan, condominium may come to the fore in two scenarios.
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 In the first scenario, 
Kosovo might be left with no option but to grant territorial autonomy to northern Kosovo. If this 
solution, often referred to as ‘Ahtisaari Plus’, allows for any sort of jurisdiction of Serbia over 
that part of territory, it would turn northern Kosovo into a condominium under a shared Kosovan-
Serb sovereignty and jurisdiction. But if it does not allow for any Serbian jurisdiction, then 
instead of a condominium we would have a form of autonomy that adds a stronger territorial 
dimension to the multi-ethnic dimension of the Kosovan legal structure. 
In the second scenario, if the present stalemate continues, the whole territory of Kosovo 
might become a ‘soft condominium’ in which Kosovo residents would be legally tied to two 
different states, namely Serbia and Albania, in addition to their link to Kosovo. The first step 
towards the realisation of this scenario is dual citizenship. Serbs of Kosovo are already included 
in the citizenry of Serbia and hold Serb passports (which secures them visa-free travel to the EU). 
On the other hand, the majority of people in Kosovo (mainly Kosovan Albanians, who in fact 
hold Kosovan passports alone), remain the only passport holders in the Western Balkans that still 
need visas to travel to the Schengen Zone countries. Their unfavourable position pushes them to 
look for other options. In this context, Albanian passports are seen as very desirable in Kosovo, 
not only for pragmatic travel-related reasons (many Kosovan Albanians see Albania as their kin 
state and have a symbolic attachment to it). This scenario of large-scale (Serb-Albanian) 
overlapping of citizenship regimes in Kosovo would render the latter’s passports unworthy and 
seriously undermine Kosovan citizenship, and deepen its internal divisions. 
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Even if a large number of Kosovo Albanians were to acquire Albanian citizenship, 
without an enhanced role of Albania in Kosovo, that situation still would contain more features of 
strongly overlapping citizenship constellations rather than territorial condominium. So far 
Albania has not claimed any jurisdiction in Kosovo or a protective role in Kosovo and is not very 
likely to do so in the near future.  However, when it comes to the role of Albania, it might 
become part of the Kosovo puzzle in an in extremis situation, such as with the division of 
Kosovo. Several politicians in Serbia (including the President and Deputy Prime Minister) have 
recently spoken about such a scenario, where the Serb inhabited regions in Kosovo would join 
Serbia and the rest of the territory would go to Albania. The realisation of such scenario would 
certainly have implications in other countries in the region (i.e. Bosnia and Macedonia) and most 
importantly, would mean the certain death of the Kosovan citizenship and statehood.   
To sum up the argument, Kosovo’s nascent citizenship regime represents the seventh 
independent citizenship regime to emerge (so far) in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. It 
differs from the others in that it represents a ‘new-state’ (‘zero option’) model resulting from a 
process of institutional and constitutional engineering led by international actors. In the context 
of the nature of the polity, due to the presence of elements of both civic republicanism and 
multiculturalism, Kosovo can be defined as a state with institutionalised multi-ethnicity hidden 
behind a mantel of civicness. However, notwithstanding its ‘Europeanised’ institutional and legal 
infrastructure, at present, Kosovo remains a disputed territory, where Serb and Kosovan 
jurisdictions and sovereignties overlap, most notably in the northern part of Kosovo. These 
blurred boundaries and overlapping jurisdictions make both Serbia and Kosovo unfinished and 
unconsolidated states with no clear territorial boundaries. Certainly, this context is not the most 
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